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Summary: 
This paper attempts to investigate the relationship 
between foreign debt and repayment problems on investment 
behavior in Less Developed Countries (LDCs). It is primarily 
motivated by earlier studies which have found empirical 
evidence of such a relationship, but did not attempt to 
incorporate it into a theore tical model which could shed 
light on the functioning o f developing macroeconomies. An 
effort will be made to address this possibility b y modeling 
the determinants of private inve stment in LDes in a way that 
will allow an examination of the effects of high external 
debt and repayment problems on private investment. This will 
be achieved by assuming a parallel informal market for 
savings which operates by means of a simultaneous equations 
model of supply and demand. Conceptually, such a model is 
just an extension of previous attempts to understand the 
parallel capital markets that arise in the context of 
interest rate controls and credit rationing common in LDCs. 
The equations of the resultant private investment model will 
consider external debt and r e payment problems explicitly in 
terms of their effects on credit ceilings, which are likely 
to be applicable due to the possibility of countries 
defaulting on their foreign debt . 
Savings will be assumed to clear through arbitrage in 
the informal capital market by means of an unobserved 
1 
interest rate . This will provide a means of analyzing 
investment while avoiding some of the problems which commonly 
arise while looking at investment in developing countries. 
Substitution for the unobserved market clearing interest rate 
will allow the formulation of a reduced form equation, the 
signs of whose coefficients may be predicted from the 
original supply and demand equations. Since the reduced form 
equation contains only observable variables, its coefficients 
may be empirically determined. 
Background for the study: 
The 1980 ' s witnessed historically unprecedented debt 
repayment problems on the part of many LDCs. The low or 
negative real interest rates of the 1970's, inflationary oil 
shocks and an abundance of petrodollar deposits in the 
international banking system had resulted in large 
acquisitions of ~ebteGR~s during the preceding years . All 
. / 
of these culminated in the debt crisis and the reschedulings 
of the early 80's. In the light of this, it is natural to 
ask the question of what the growth effects of these episodes 
were. Cohen (1991) found that there was indeed a significant 
negative effect of foreign debt payments on investment for 
countries that rescheduled their debt. That study also found 
that countries which did not reschedule experienced a less 
severe negative relationship between foreign debt repayment 
and investment . 
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However, the above result is difficult to understand 
without further information. Cohen points out that 
rescheduling activity is associated with markedly different 
investment behavior, but does not adequately address the 
causes for such a relationship. This omission is 
understandable, as the question here is what the determinants 
of investment in LCDs are, and is one which is not easily 
answered. To do so will require a model for investment which 
incorporates the effects of debt repayments and 
reschedulings. It is the goal of this paper to present such 
a model. 
What the above ultimately requires is a model for 
private investment in LDC's, as public investment is -, , 
essentially an exogenous policy variable. That in itself is 
-~----
problematic, however, largely due to the policies of credit 
rationing and controlled interest rates that are often 
employed in developing countries. As summarized by Greene 
and Villanueva (1991): 
"A variety of hypotheses have been advanced to 
explain the variations in private investment 
observed in developing countries ... The 
neoclassical flexible-accelerator model has been 
the most widely accepted general theory of 
investment behavior ... However, it has generally 
been hard to test this model in developing 
countries, because key assumptions (such as perfect 
capital markets and little or no government 
investment) are inapplicable, and data for certain 
variables (capital stock, real wages, and real 
financing rates for debt and equity) are normally 
either unavailable or inadequate." 
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Since foreign debt related factors are likely to affect 
growth through investment, the analysis of their effects 
should take place in the context of a model which explicitly 
takes into account the characteristics of LDC debt and 
investment. In particular, the debt related terms must be 
related to the availability of foreign savings. In the 
supply and demand model proposed, foreign borrowing can be 
placed into the supply in a simple manner. 
In addition, the adoption of a simultaneous equations 
model of an informal capital market overcomes the data 
problem of obtaining meaningful interest rates in the context 
of repressive credit policies commonplace in LDCs. The 
widespread effects of government policy in the capital 
allocation process renders official interest rates largely 
irrelevant to investment decision making, and allows for the 
presence of parallel markets whose interest rates must 
reflect the true costs of and returns from savings . 
A parallel savings market is thus essential to the 
proposed model to enable the use of supply and demand 
concepts. Informal credit markets have not played a large 
role in past investment models, having generally been 
considered relevant only in rural situations where more 
1 
formal markets are not feasible.' However, there has been 
some recognition that the creation of credit arbitrage 
opportunities by capital rationing policies may result in 
significant permeation of parallel markets into the economy. 
4 
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The macroeconomic implications of informal credit existing 
alongside the formal market was examined in terms of its 
effects on monetary policy by Montiel (1991). The proposal 
that unregulated parallel market interest rates provide the 
means of market clearing is pe~haps n'ot qnrealistic. Even in 
urban areas, this could take the form of entrepreneurs taking 
out loans at official interest rates and then lending to a 
second party (or to themselves) at a higher "market" interest 
rate. The crucial insight is that the market rate must be 
higher than the official rate, or officially allocated credit 
will not clear; thus arbitrage is pro fitable until an 
equilibrium is reached. Savings and investment decisions 
will ultimately be based upon the higher informal rate . 
The Private Investment Model; 
In attempting to model the supply and demand of private 
investment in LDes, an effort was made to incorporate both 
standard ideas of the determinant s of savings as well as some 
additional features which would serve to account for debt 
payment and rescheduling effects. While the demand side of 
the market was kept as simple as possible, the supply side 
was constructed in a manner which would allow f o r the 
interaction of foreign lenders and investors with the 
domestic economy . 
.. . : .... ~ 
For the purpose of cross-country scaling, all fiscal 
quantities are expressed as fractions of GNP. GNP was used 
5 
rather than GDP as it was thought that international factor 
payments might be relevant to debt payment behavior .. 
Supply of Savings· 
The analysis of private investment behavior is 
facilitated if its various sectors are examined separately . 
Savings available for domestic investment is thus broken up 
into private savings, government savings and foreign savings . 




Private investment (I ' ) is the sum of private and 
government savings (S' and SG) and foreign savings (FS' and 
FSG) less government investment (IG). Here foreign savings is 
identically equal to the current account, and includes 
changes in foreign reserves. 
, 
') {' . , r,.".l 
" 
I P = sP + SG + FSP + FSG - IG t -t t t t t [ 1] f 
Prjyate sayjngs; 
Private savings is taken to incorporate savings made by 
domestic residents and factors of production which remain 
available for domestic investment . It does not include 
savings that originate domestically but are subsequently 
invested abroad through capital flight, as these are no 
longer available to domestic investors, Such funds will 
instead form part of the foreign savings component of supply, 
an elaboration of which will fol low. Assuming that savings 
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decisions will only be affected by foreign interest rates if 
those savings are intended for investment abroad, it is 
reasonable that an equation for private savings will contain 
only domestic interest rates. 
It is assumed that since both taxes (T) and private 
sector interest payments (IpP) serve to reduce the income from 
which savings may occur (taken to be Y-T-IpP), these should 
both enter the supply equations with negative coefficients . 
Savings decisions regarding funds not taking part in 
capital flight will be based upon both the real official 
interest rate for rationed credit (rAAT ) , and a real unobserved 
informal market rate (r) . Though unobserved, the informal 
interest rate cannot be lower than the official one, or 
rationed credit will not clear; individuals should choose to 
borrow through official channels only if the loans available 
there are at least as cheap as those available in the 
informal market .. However, some savings should still be 
generated by the lower r AAT in the official market due to 
incomplete access to, or information about, the higher 
returns available from loans in the parallel market. Both 
official and informal market real interest rates should 
therefore enter the supply equation with positive 
coefficients. 
By the permanent income hypothesis, high growth rates 
(GR) are likely to increase the s upply of savings in LDes. 
Given the uncertainty which many developing economies were 
7 
subject to in the sample period, it is probable that wage 
earners who experienced changes in income during periods of 
high growth were doubtful that the current income levels 
would be sustained. According to the permanent income 
hypothesis, marginal propensity to consume is lower for 
transitory income than for permanent income. This is 
especially so when income variability is high, as people will 
learn from experience not to consume as if the current year 
is representative of the long-term. Thus savings should be 
increased by a high growth rate, which should be widely 
perceived as a temporary phenomenon and therefore induce a 
high marginal rate of savings from increased incomes. 
~;rl~·th rates should have a positive coefficient 
vin~. 
~-/7 
According to the findings of Serven and Solimano (1991) 
regarding the negative effects of domestic instability, high 
inflation rate variation will cause people to lose confidence 
in the gains from investment and effective government policy. 
This effect is separate from that of changes in real returns 
from investment brought about by price fluctuation, which has 
already taken into account through the use of real interest 
rates. However, the instability effect is likely to be 
pronounced only when inflation rates are high; variation in a 
consistently low inflation rate is unlikely t o bring about a 
significant breakdown of confidence in the government's 
ability to pursue stable policies. Furthermore, periods of 
high inflation will often be reflected in correspondingly low 
8 
or negative real interest rates, due to the often inflexible 
qualities of LDC deposit rates. Inflation rates have thus 
not been included in the demand specification, in order to] ' jAl~)'" I 
. ~ ".t;-,r- • \ 
avoid problems of col linearity with the real interest rate, 'j 
In the light of the above, private savings (SF) is 
modeled as follows . 




+ a3r~T + a,r t + as ( GR t ) [2] 
This represents the public sector contribution to the 
supply of savings. Savings of the government c an be defined 
in a simple manner from the public budget constraint. As 
expressed below, this simply states that government savings 
(SG) are equal to tax revenues (T) less government consumption 
,minus grants received (CG-GT) less interest payments on the 
" 
government debt (IpG) . 
Grants received by the government are accounted for by 
subtracting them from consumption, as grants represent funds 
whose use will not drain tax revenues from savings. It would 
perhaps be more intuitive to simply add grants to taxes, as 
both represent sources of funds from which the government can 
spend or save. However, this would be problematic in that 
the two have been proposed to enter the model in very 
different manners. Specifically, tax revenues should enter 
the private savings equation with a negative c oefficient due 
9 
, , ' 
to their effects on disposable income; grants have no direct 
role in private savings. 
SG .:s.. ( c~ GT t ) IpG _t - __ t [ 3 ] 
Yt Yt Yt Yt 
-.,-
" '- - ,.l. 
ECl:eig:o Saying5: 
Availability of foreign savings (FS) which are supplied 
under risk of default are assumed to be determined by a 
credit ceiling rather than interest rates. This is in 
accordance with the theoretical work of Cohen and Sachs 
(1986) as well as others who have dealt with default risks of 
highly indebted countries. These risks will probably not be 
fully represented by interest rates, as countries who intend 
to default will not be deterred from borrowing by the 
prospect of high interest payments. Wit hout an intention to 
repay loans, it makes sense for them to borrow as much as 
possible before default cuts them o ff from further credit. 
In effect, relying solely on interest rates c ould have the 
effect of screening put all prospective borrowers except 
;\1 
those without commitment to repay. To prevent this screening 
out of countries who do not intend default through high 
interest rates, lenders must limit supply at the point where 
the net marginal benefits of debt s e rvicing and continued 
inflow of credit is equal to that o f the alternative; 
defaulting on debt payments with the subsequent termination 
of credit flows . 
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In addition, some foreign savings will not be supplied 
y-
These include direct investment "and 
/'.1> , 
under risk of default. 
the repatriation of savings invested abroad by domestic 
residents These inflows of savings may be thought to OCCur 
primarily due to a real interest rate differential. 
Similarly, capital flight may be assumed to take place in an 
amount depending upon the differential between the foreign 
real rate (r*) and the real informal market rate (r). Thus, 
it is expected that all of these capital fl ows should produce 
a positive coefficient for the real informal interest rate 
and a negative coefficient f o r the real f o reign interest rate 
in the foreign savings supply . 
Rescheduling activity is proposed to affect investment 
through a lowering of the credit ceiling and a decrease in 
loan inflows. This could be brought about if it served to 
increase the l enders' perceptions of a country's riskiness; a 
country which rescheduled in the past may n o t be c onsidered 
credible in its agreements to make payments on time in the 
future. Of course, such a view is simplistic. It does not 
account for possible variation according t o the type of debt 
rescheduled, the cause of the rescheduling or the 
psychological impact on lenders. It is possible that under 
some circumstances, a negotiated reschedul i ng may have a 
positive rather than negative effect on confidenc e; or even 
no effect at a ll. For example, if the need for rescheduling 
is brought about by what seems to be a one-time external 
shock, then the re would be little cause t o consider it an 
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indication future repayment problems . Furthermore, internal 
changes, perhaps political in nature, could cause a country 
to reschedule while at the same time increasing lender 
confidence and the credit ceiling. This would probably be 
the case if a change in government resulted in new leadership 
which lenders perceived as more trustworthy, for whatever 
reason . 
Nonetheless , it is still possible that in general 
rescheduling has negative effec ts on the supply of foreign 
savings. A variable (R) is therefore proposed to model the 
effect that rescheduling or not rescheduling debt have on 
lender confidence and the credit ceiling. It i s constructed 
.1, ~,_ 
v/\ ti" ~ · l ', ' , 
for each country in a given year as 1'i (years since the last 
rescheduling of any debt repayments). This allows a 
sustained effect which decreases with the passage of time 
without further repayment problems, as l ender confidence is 
restored. Thi s is in keeping with the results of Cohen 
(1991) on the negative r e lationship between rescheduling and 
foreign investment. If rescheduling really has a negative 
effect, (R) should have a negative coeff i c i e nt in the foreign 
savings equation . 
Total scheduled debt payments divided by exports (DP/X) 
is taken to be a measure of a country's riskiness, in that it 
represents to what extent total resources, in terms of the 
country's foreign exchange liquidity constraint, are already 
expected to be rtlade available for debt service. Scheduled \J \.~) ;., 
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payments (actual plus .},escheduled) are used as it was thought 
\ 
undesirable to ' reward countries who reschedule their debt and 
/ 
consequently need to use little of their export earnings for 
debt service. As the variable gets larger, lenders should 
anticipate future repayment problems and further reduce the 
ceiling. It is thus expected to have a negative coefficient. 
Interest paid as a fraction of GNP is taken to be an 
indication of how trustworthy and capable of repayment 
lenders perceive a country to be. It is conceivable that 
lenders may be willing to extend new loans for principal 
rescheduling as long as a country shows that it is committed 
to maintaining high levels of interest payment s. In 
addition, that a country is willing and able to maintain high 
levels of repayment may in itself be reassur ing to its 
creditors. For this purpose, interest payment s made on non-
guaranteed debt to the private sector was used . Since these 
may considered to be the least " o fficial" form of interest 
payments, it is possible that they will be most 
representative measure of a country's ability to repay, 
independent of the debt repayment policies o f individual 
governments. It should be expected t o have a positive effect 
on foreign savings . 
The foreign savings equation may thus be written as 
follows. 
= ~o + ~l R t + ~2 ( D~t ) + ~3 ( I:t~ ) + ~4 (r ~ - r t ) [ 4] 
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Demand for Sayings· 
The second component of the private investment model is 
the demand for savings. This is far simpler than the supply 
equation, and can be formulated from a few standard ideas 
pertaining to the macroeconomic situation in LDCs. Among 
these are complementarity between public and private 
investment, the accelerator and the real market clearing 
interest rate. 
Long-term complementarity between public investment (IG) 
and private investment reflects the possibility that public 
investment is a reflection of infrastructural development; 
the lack of which could be an important barrier to 
opportunity for private investors in LDCs. An increase in 
infrastructural development would increase demand for savings 
by encouraging private investors. Blejer and Khan (1984) 
found this relationship to hold true, using the trend level 
of public investment as a proxy for infrastructural outlays . 
They assumed that such investments, which would include 
expenses on such durables as roads and telecommunications, 
would vary less from year to year than non-infrastructural 
components. Hence the trend level wou ld be a better proxy 
then actual public investment in a given year. However, this 
assumption ignores the possibility that some non-
infrastructural components of public investment are dictated 
by political necessity. Since the growth effects of non-
infrastructural public investment is questionable, it is 
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possible that these are maintained due to political rather 
than economic pressures. If so, the trend level of public 
investment may not be a good indicator of infrastructural 
outlays, which are likely to carry a good deal of the year to 
year variation in total public investment due to their low 
political priority. 
In this paper, lagged public investment (IpG)is used 
instead of its trend level to account for the possible 
variability in infrastructural outlays. It is expected that 
lagged public investment will provide a measure of 
infrastructural development by at least reflecting the extent 
to which depreciation was offset. If total public investment 
was low in the previous year, it may reflect that the stock 
of infrastructural investment grew only slightly, or may even 
have decreased if inflexible non-infrastructural outlays 
prevented depreciation from being covered. Thus the lagged 
public investment may be expected to have a positive 
coefficient in investment demand . 
Demand for savings can also be thought of as rising with 
the difference between the present stock of capital and the 
desired stock of capital. This is easily incorporated 
through an accelerator model which assumes a constant ratio 
between income level and desired capital stock. It has the 
added advantage of permitting the use of income level as a 
measure of capital stock, for which reliable data do not 
exist for LDCs. In this case, the change in desired capital 
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stock between a current and previous year is proxied with the 
lagged growth rate term (GRt-l), which should therefore enter 
the demand specification with a positive coefficient . 
The final determinant of demand for private investment 
considered here will be the cost of savings that investors 
perceive, as reflected by the informal market. The 
assumption of arbitrage in the informal capital market 
results in all investment decisions taking place at the 
higher market clearing rate (r). Even if investors have 
access to credit at the lower official rate (rrat) , they will 
not make the decision to invest based upon that rate, sinCe 
they can obtain the higher rate simply by resorting to the 
informal market. The informal market rate must then 
represent the true opportunity cost of investment. It should 
be expected to enter the demand equation with a negative 
coefficient. 
Yo + [5] 
Reduced form equation: 
Since the supply and demand in the informal market for 
savings clears through the unobserved interest rate (r), this 
variable can be substituted out from both s upply and demand 
equations to yield a reduced form equation composed entirely 
of observable variables . 
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This is given below; The sum of government consumption 
minus grants, public investment and government interest 
payments is lumped into a single variable, government 
expenditure l ess grants received (G). This is expected to 
have a negative coefficient . 
p 




~ I t _ 1 
10 y 
t 
[ 6 ] 
Since a high official real interest rate (r) is 
considered to have a positive effect on private savings, it 
is expected to have a positive coefficient. On the other 
hand, a high foreign interest rate (r') is expected to 
decrease inflow of foreign savings and should thus have a 
negative coefficient . 
Both current and lagged growth rates (GR) should have 
positive coefficients, the former through t he permanent 
income hypothesis' prediction for private saving, the latter 
due to the accelerator component of demand. 
The rescheduling variable (R) and scheduled debt service 
divided by exports (OP/X) are expected to have negative 
coefficients, through their effects on the credit ceiling and 
foreign savings . 
The net effect of taxes is uncertain, as they affect 
supply positively through government savings, but negatively 
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through personal savings . However, they are likely to have a 
positive coefficient simply because their direct effect on 
the government budget constraint is likely to be stronger 
than their indirect effect on personal savings through 
income. 
The sign of the coefficient for interest payments made 
by the private sector (IpP) are also uncertain. These serve 
to reduce personal savings just as taxes do, but also have a 
positive effect on the foreign savings. 
Lagged public investment ( IGt _ 1) should have a positive 
coefficient according to the complementarity effects 
described. 
Regressioo results; 
First an OLSQ regression was run . After that, panel 
regressions were run with countries as identifiers . 
OLSO Results· 
Dependent variable: IpP 
Std. dev. of dependent var. = 3 . 95762 
Mean of dependent variable = 11.3159 
Sum of squared residualS = 4488.61 
Variance of residuals = 13.4390 
Std. error of regression = 3.66592 
R-squared = .166922 
Adjusted R-squared = .141980 
Durbin-Watson statistic = .562884 
F-statistic (zero slopes) = 6.69230 
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J:;:>t jmated Standaz::d 
Variable Coefficjent Error t-stat istic 
intercept 10.0021 .776929 12.8739 
IGt _1 .173551 .070183 2.47285 
Gt -8.56863 3.32804 -2.57468 
Tt 11. 9502 4.76956 2.50551 
r RAT .352709E-02 . 958518E-02 0.367973 
GRt .769316 3.09648 0.248448 
GRt _1 6.57389 2.82091 2.33041 
DP/X -3.78094 1 .16342 -3.24986 
R -.896259 .646074 -1. 38724 
Ip· 102.860 31. 6045 3.25461 
r* .072048 .070997 1. 01480 
From the above it is apparent that the coefficients of 
lagged public investment, government expenditure, tax 
revenues, lagged growth rate and debt payments divided by 
exports all agreed with the predictions made, and were 
significant at the 5% level. Interest payments were also 
significant, and positive in sign; this would imply that 
their positive effects on foreign savings overwhelm their 
negative effects through private saving. 
The rescheduling variable (R) turns out to be 
insignificant at even the 10% level, though it is of the 
right sign. It is possible that this is due to the fact that 
countries who reschedule principal but maintain timely 
interest payments represent less of a worry to lenders. If 
so, the inclusion of the interest payments term may be 
softening the explanatory pm'ler of rescheduling . 
Even though some degree of col linearity was expected 
between the government expenditure, revenue and lagged 
19 
investment, all three turned out to be significant , 
indicating that this may not be a major problem. 
The F-statistic shows that the regression as a whole is o ••• _~) 
significant. However, the Durbin-Watson statistic indicates ------ -- -- - -~--. .--
/ 
that heteroskedasticity is very likely to be present. R-
squared was very low . 
However, it is difficult to know how meaningful these 
results are, due to the fact that the OLSQ regression has not 
taken into consideration that the data consists of a panel of 
countries between whom there is a possibility for 
heteroskedasticity. Heteroscedasticy caused by each country 
behaving consistently below or above the overall best fit 
line could also result in the production of autocorrelation 
within each country ' s observations. 
Pane 1 Reslllt s ; 
The TSP "between" estimates of coefficients, which were 
the result of an OLS regression on the means of each variable 
over time, were almost all insignificant. Only the interest 
payments term remained significant at the 10 % level, and 
retained its positive sign. This result wou ld indicate 
. t' C 
whatever explanatory power the model has may be over time 
rather than through means . 
The TSP "variance component s" estimates, which allow for 
random effects between countries, are given below. Random 
20 
effects could not be ruled out as the correct model through 
the Hausman test. 
Mean of dependent variable = 2 . 27480 
Std. error of regression = 2 . 23734 
Std. dev. of dependent var. = 2.19231 
Sum of squared residuals = 1516.73 
R-squared = .084129 
Adjusted R-squared = -.039801 
variance of residuals = 5.00570 
Estimated StandaJ::d 
Vadahle Coefficient Error 
IG
t
_ 1 .037510 .058771 
G -2.76454 4.07362 
T 13.2744 6.55925 
rRAT -.554929E-02 .625515E-02 
GRt -3.50381 2.02371 
GRt-l 2.52550 1 .85706 
DP/X -2.69891 .967176 
R -.314159 .446632 
IP' -35.9344 28.7480 
r* .015978 .046126 













Hausman test of FE vs.RE: CHISQ (10) = 8.1943 
With the random effects estimates, only tax revenues and 
debt payments divided by exports remained significant and of 
the predicted signs at the 5% confidence level. Growth rate 
was also significant at the 10% level, but of the wrong sign. 
Coocludjng statements· 
The objective of this paper was to attempt to propose a 
theoretical framework in which the negative relationship 
between foreign debt rescheduling and private investment in 
LDes could be understood. To t h is end, an attempt was made 
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to bring together ideas of informal credit markets and credit 
ceilings which may be particularly relevant and to construct 
a model of supply and demand which incorporated debt 
repayment effects . 
The empirical results are not very good, however . While 
the OLSQ results seem promising, their meaning is 
questionable given the nature of the panel data. 'By 








A~pendix regarding pata 
Total number of countries: 32. Period spanned: 1971-1989 . 
Total number of observations: 345 . 
Maximum number of observations per country: 19 . 
Minimum number of observations per country: 4 . 
Countries included: Argentina, Bangladesh, Belize, Bolivia, 
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, E1 Salvador, Fiji, 
If.,th-li-
bb,. ~ I I 
Ghana, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Malawi, ~,(,~ , 
Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Pakistan, j~"""" ~---
Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, 
Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zimbabwe . 
Figures for public and private fixed investment were 
taken from "Trends in Investment in Developing Countries 
1992", produced by the IMF. I am thankful for Peter 
Montiel's assistance in providing me with this da t a. 
All foreign debt related figures are from the World Debt 
Tables. Tota l scheduled debt service was obta ined for each 
year by adding current rescheduling to a c tual payments made . 
Rescheduling data were primarily obtained fr om Wo r ld Debt 
tables, and included principal, intere s t and total debt stock 
rescheduling. Additional reschedu ling data was provided by 
Barbara Craig, for which I am grateful . 
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Interest payments on foreign debt used are those made on 
private non-guaranteed loans . 
Fiscal data were obtained from International Financial 
Statistics, published by the IMF. Taxes were government 
revenue. Government expenditure and grants received were 
taken from the corresponding lines. GNP data was taken from 
IFS where available; otherwise, it was obtained from the 
World Debt Tables, published by the World Bank. 
Interest rate and price data were also from IFS . The 
foreign real interest rate r * is constructed from the 6-month 
Eurodollar rate in London. It was deflated with a GNP-
weighted average of inflation rates in OECD countries. 
Domestic inflation rates were taken from percentage changes 
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